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Map of the Colorado River Basin     
Comparison of Consumptive Uses, Losses, 
d W t S l 1922 P tan  a er upp y -  vs. resen  
Colorado River Mainstem
(Values in Million Acre-Feet per Year)
1922 Present
Reconstructed average virgin flow at Lee Ferry 17.5 15.0
Long term reconstructed average 13.5
     
Lowest reconstructed ten-year period 9.7
Lowest ten-year period of record 11.8
Lower Basin tributary inflow 3.0 1.4 
Total available water supply (Mainstem) 20.5 11.1-16.4 
Upper Basin Uses 2.5 4.2
Upper Basin Reservoir Evaporation --- 0.5
Total Upper Basin Uses 2.5 4.7 
Lower Basin Mainstem Uses 2 6 8 0
T t l M i t U
   . .
Lower Basin Reservoir Evaporation --- 1.8
Total Lower Basin Mainstem Uses 2.6 9.8 
Delivery to Mexico and Welton-Mohawk bypass 1.6 
o a  a ns em ses 6.1 16.1
Source, Lochhead, "An Upper Basin Perspective on California's Claims to Water From the Colorado River, Part I: 
The Law of the River," 4 U. Den. L. Rev. 290 (Spring 2001).
 
Water, Climate and Uncertainty: 
Implications for Western Water Law, Policy and Management 
 
24th Conference of the Natural Resources Law Center 
University of Colorado 
June 11-13, 2003 
 
 




James S. Lochhead 
Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C. 
 
 
I. The Law of Interstate Apportionment of Water 
a. Congress.  Congress may allocate water between states in order to serve the 
national interest and may supersede state law in order to do so.  Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
b. U.S. Supreme Court.  Water may be judicially divided between states on the basis 
of equitable apportionment.  Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Nebraska 
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
c. States. 
i. Congressional consent is required for states to enter into a compact, which 
may be conditioned upon the states’ compliance with specified terms.  
U.S. CONST. Art. I, §10, cl. 3 – "No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time 
of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with 
a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." 
ii. States can agree to apportion water by interstate compact, and even a 
preexisting water right, which is a property right, can be limited by the 
terms of such a compact.  A compact can delegate power to the states to 
appoint the members of the commission or other controlling entity created 
by the compact. Also, water can be apportioned, and the use of water 
limited, by interstate compact consented to by Congress.  In Hinderlider v. 
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1937), the Court 
said: “The compact – the legislative means – adopts to our union of 
sovereign states the age old treaty making power of independent sovereign 
nations . . ..  Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate 
stream be made by compact between the upper and lower states with the 
consent of Congress, or by decree of the Court, the apportionment is 
binding upon the citizens of each state and all water claimants, even where 





d. Enforcement of Interstate Compacts and Apportionments 
i. Once approved by Congress, an interstate compact is transformed into 
federal law.  The compact then is immune to certain constitutional 
objections, including commerce clause objections.  A state may not amend 
or withdraw from a compact without congressional consent.  In West 
Virginia v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951), the Court said:  “But a compact 
is after all a legal document. Though the circumstances of its drafting are 
likely to assure great care and deliberation, all avoidance of disputes as to 
scope and meaning is not within human gift. Just as this Court has power 
to settle disputes between States where there is no compact, it must have 
final power to pass upon the meaning and validity of compacts. It requires 
no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly 
entered into between States by those who alone have political authority to 
speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final meaning by an 
organ of one of the contracting States. A State cannot be its own ultimate 
judge in a controversy with a sister State.” 
ii. The state is ultimately liable for violation, even by individuals within the 
state.  In Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 406 (1933), Illinois tried to 
avoid responsibility by claiming a sanitation district was responsible for 
the wrongful acts in Lake Michigan.  However, the Court found that "the 
State of Illinois by virtue of its status and authority as a state is the 
primary and responsible defendant.  While the sanitation district is the 
immediate instrumentality of the wrong found to have been committed . . . 
by the diversion of water from Lake Michigan, that instrumentality was 
created and has continuously been maintained by the State of Illinois." 
iii. The Supreme Court has broad authority to fashion a remedy for violation 
of its orders.  Potential remedies could include additional, more specific 
injunctive relief, a contempt order and associated sanctions, or an order 
requiring repayment in water or money 
1. Injunction.  In Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 133 (1987), the 
Court enjoined New Mexico to meet its obligation of water 
deliveries to Texas as required under the Pecos River Compact.  
The injunction was more clearly described by the Court in the 
amended decree included in its opinion in Texas v. New Mexico, 
485 U.S. 388 (1988). 
2. Monetary Judgments.  Relying in part on the Court's 1987 opinion 
in Texas v. New Mexico, the Special Master in Kansas v. Colorado, 
No. 105 Original, recommended that the Court require Colorado to 
pay money damages, including prejudgment interest, for its 
violations of the Arkansas River Compact.  Third Report of 
Special Master, August 2000. 
II. Compact and Equitable Apportionment Strategies 
a. Flows           
i. Big Blue River Compact (Nebraska and Kansas).  “During the period, 
May 1-September 30, the state of Nebraska shall regulate diversions from 




water appropriators junior to November 1, 1968, in order to maintain 
minimum mean daily flows at the state-line gaging stations.”  Article 5.2 
(b). 
ii. South Platte River Compact (Colorado and Nebraska).  “Between the first 
day of April and the fifteenth day of October of each year, Colorado shall 
not permit diversions from the Lower Section of the river, to supply 
Colorado appropriations having adjudicated dates of priority subsequent to 
the fourteenth day of June, 1897, to an extent that will diminish the flow 
of the river at the Interstate Station, on any day, below a mean flow of 120 
cubic feet of water per second of time . . ..”  Article IV (2). 
b. Interstate administration 
i. Bear River Compact (Idaho, Utah and Wyoming).  Establishes an 
interstate administrative agency to enforce the compact, and adjust 
allocations based on water emergencies. 
ii. Amended Costilla Creek Compact (Colorado and New Mexico).  Provides 
for interstate administration of priorities between Colorado and New 
Mexico. 
iii. Arkansas River Compact (Colorado and Kansas).  Provides for storage 
account in John Martin Reservoir in Colorado for the benefit of Kansas, 
administration of priorities in Colorado to assure John Martin fill, and 
delivery of usable state line flows. 
c. Hydrologic Based Apportionments 
i. Republican River Compact (Colorado, Kansas and Nebraska).  Allocates 
specific quantities of water to each state (Colorado, Nebraska and 
Wyoming), but provides for adjustment of the allocation if the computed 
virgin water supply varies more than 10 percent form the calculation upon 
which the allocation is based. 
ii. Pecos River Compact (New Mexico and Texas).  New Mexico “shall not 
deplete by man’s activities the flow of the Pecos River at the New 
Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to Texas a 
quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947 
condition.”  Article III (a).  Enforced by the U.S. Supreme Court decree in 
Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 388 (1987). 
III. The Law of the Colorado River – combination of annual flow delivery, interstate 
administration, long-term delivery and hydrologic based apportionments. 
a. Mexican Water Treaty – Creates “first call” on the River of 1.5 maf/yr., delivered 
at the international boundary 
i. Article 10 (b) – “In the event of extraordinary drought . . . thereby making 
it difficult for the United States to deliver the guaranteed quantity of 
1,500,000 acre-feet . . . a year, the water allotted to Mexico . . . will be 
reduced in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States 
are reduced.” 
ii. Colorado River Compact, Article III (c) – “If, as a matter of international 
comity, the United States of America shall hereafter recognize in the 
United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the Colorado 




surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this 
purpose, then the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the 
upper basin and the lower basin, and whenever necessary the States of the 
upper division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the 
deficiency so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).” 
1. Lower Basin View – Upper Basin shares one-half of the burden 
2. Upper Basin View – Lower Basin bears entire burden 
b. Present Perfected Rights 
i. Colorado River Compact, Article VIII – “Present perfected rights to the 
beneficial use of water of the Colorado River System are unimpaired by 
this compact.” 
ii. Defined as “Rights in existence prior to June 25, 1929, the effective date 
of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.”  Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 
341 (1963). 
iii. Quantified in Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).  Total more than 
4 maf. 
c. Lower Basin Apportionment 
i. Colorado River Compact, Article III (a) and (b) – Apportions right to 
consumptive use of the waters of the Colorado River Basin, 8.5 maf to 
Lower Basin (including Lower Basin Tributaries) 
ii. Colorado River Compact, Article III (d) – Upper Basin may not deplete 
the flow of the Colorado River Mainstem below 75 maf in any 10-year 
period 
iii. Colorado River Compact, Article III (e) – “The States of the upper 
division shall not withhold water, and the States of the lower division shall 
not require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to 
domestic and agricultural uses.” 
iv. Apportionment within the Lower Basin, 1928 Boulder Canyon Project 
Act, 45 Stat. 1057, and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 340 (1964). 
1. California – 4.4 maf, further divided by the Seven Party 
Agreement 
a. Palo Verde, the Yuma Project (Reservation Division), 
Imperial Irrigation District and Coachella Valley Water 
District – 1st three priorities -- 3.85 maf 
b. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California -- 4th 
and 5th priorities – 1.212 maf 
c. Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley Water 
District and Palo Verde – 6th Priority – 0.3 maf 
d. Remaining land in Imperial Irrigation District – 7th Priority 
2. Arizona – 2.8 maf 
3. Nevada – 0.3 maf 
d. Upper Basin Apportionment 
i. 1948 Upper Basin Compact – Divides the consumptive use available to 
the Upper Basin, between the states on a percentage basis 




2. New Mexico – 11.25% 
3. Utah – 23.00% 
4. Wyoming – 14.00% 
5. Arizona – 50,000 AF 
ii. Upper Basin Commission makes factual findings as to consumptive uses 
and losses. 
e. River Operational Rules 
i. 1970 Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria 
1. Secretary to determine 602(a) storage by Sept. 30 of each year1 
2. Objective release from Powell to be minimum of 8.23 maf if: 
a. Upper Basin Storage Reservoirs active storage forecast is 
less than the 602(a) storage determined by the Secretary for 
that year, or  
b. Lake Powell active storage forecast for that date is less than 
the Lake Mead active storage forecast for that date. 
3. Lake Mead Operation 
a. Normal – annual pumping and release from Lake Mead 
will be sufficient to satisfy 7.5 maf of annual consumptive 
use in accordance w/the Decree in Arizona v. California 
b. Surplus – apportioned 50% California, 46% Arizona, and 
4% Nevada.  Secretary to determine “from time to time” 
when greater quantities are available pursuant to Article II 
(B)(2) of Arizona v. California, after consideration of 
relevant factors, including: 
i. Requirements of Art. III (1) of Operating Criteria 
ii. Requests for water 
iii. Actual and forecast quantities of active storage in 
Mead and the Upper Basin Storage Reservoirs 
iv. Estimated net inflow to Mead 
c. Shortage – Secretary to determine “from time to time” 
when insufficient mainstream water is available to satisfy 
7.5 maf, after consideration of relevant factors 
i. Requirements of Art. III (1) of Operating Criteria 
ii. Storage in Mead 
iii. Net inflow to Mead 
iv. Historic streamflows 
v. Priorities in Art. II (a) in Arizona v. California 
vi. Purposes in Art. I (1) of Operating Criteria 
IV. The implications of drought and long-term climate change 
a. Basis for the Compact – an overly optimistic assumption of long-term water 
supply (see attached chart). 
b. Other challenges not foreseen by the Compact negotiators 
i. Unresolved issues 
                                                 
1 The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act, P.L. 90-537, Sec. 602(a)(1) and (2) requires that water be 
storage of water to supply one-half of the Mexican Treaty delivery, if any such delivery is chargeable to the 




1. Allocation of the Mexican Treaty delivery obligation between 
Upper and Lower Basins 
2. Reserved Rights 
ii. The emergence of urban demands and tourist/second home developments, 
ski areas and golf courses 
iii. Recreational and environmental values 
c. The Colorado River basin has total storage capacity of more than four times the 
average annual flow in the basin, theoretically offering an array of management 
options to meet the needs imposed by drought and climate change 
d. Despite the fact that the Upper Basin is not using its entire apportionment, all the 
water in the Basin has been allocated.  There is no “surplus.”  Therefore, 
dedicating water to a new use will take water away from an existing use. 
e. Effects of drought and long-term climate change 
i. See, generally, Severe Sustained Drought, Managing the Colorado River 
in Times of Water Shortage, Powell Consortium Issue No. 1, 1995 
(Arizona Water Resources Research Center, 350 N. Campbell, University 
of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721) – discusses impacts of severe sustained 
drought in the Colorado River Basin, and alternative policy responses, 
based on modeling of a 500-year drought, of a 38 year duration. 
ii. Results under existing operating rules 
1. Lake Powell will be drained, and remain empty for several years.  
2. Lake Mead will be low, but not drained 
3. Consumptive uses in the Lower Basin will be largely unaffected, 
with the largest effect to the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California 
4. Consumptive uses in the Upper Basin would suffer major losses 
5. Instream or nonconsumptive losses, such as hydroelectric revenue, 
water-based recreation, environmental protection and salinity 
control, would be significant 
f. Responses to changes in the assumptions upon which the Law of the River is 
based 
i. Status quo (see above) 
ii. Changes in reservoir operating rules – balancing new effects today against 
drought protection in the future 
1. Rule curve or reverse equalization 
2. Proportional sharing of shortages 
iii. Interstate and Intrastate water marketing 
iv. Monitoring the response in the real world – The California Plan 







COMPARISON OF CONSUMPTIVE USES, LOSSES, AND WATER SUPPLY 
1922 VS. PRESENT 
COLORADO RIVER MAINSTEM 
(Values in Million Acre-Feet per Year) 
 
 1922 Present 





Long term reconstructed average  13.5 
4
 
Lowest reconstructed ten-year period  9.7 
4
 
Lowest ten-year period of record  11.8 
3
 





Total available water supply (Mainstem) 20.5 
1
 11.1-16.4  





Upper Basin Reservoir Evaporation --- 0.5 
7
 
Total Upper Basin Uses 2.5  4.7  





Lower Basin Reservoir Evaporation --- 1.8 
10
 
Total Lower Basin Mainstem Uses 2.6  9.8  
Delivery to Mexico and Welton-Mohawk bypass  1.6  
Total Mainstem Uses 6.1  16.1 
 
Notes 
1. For the period 1903-1922.  This was the amount reported by Delph E. Carpenter in his Historical 
Memorandum In Re Colorado River, and Brief of Law of Interstate Compacts, June 4, 1921 at hearing on 
H.R. 6821, Judiciary Committee, Colorado House of Representatives.  In his Comments to Congress on the 
Colorado River Compact, Commissioner of Reclamation Arthur Powell Davis estimated the reconstructed 
flow at 18.1 maf/yr. Cong. Rec., January 30, 1923, pp. 2713-2717. 
2. Long term average for the period 1906-1999.   Fifty-First Annual Report, Upper Colorado River 
Commission, Salt Lake City, UT, September 30, 1999. 
3. Critical ten-year averages for the periods 1931-1940 and 1954-1963. For the twelve-year period 1953-64, the 
average annual virgin flow at Lee Ferry was only 11.6 maf.  Id. 
4. Tree ring analysis, The Lowest ten-year reconstructed record was for the period 1584-1593.  Meko, Stockton 
and Boggess, The Tree-Ring Record of Severe Sustained Drought, Water Resources Bulletin, American 
Water Resources Association, Vol. 31, No. 5, Oct. 1995. 
5. As used by the Lower Colorado Region, Bureau of Reclamation, informal communication. 
6. Report of Delph E. Carpenter, December 15, 1922. 
7. Upper Colorado River States Depletion Schedule, 2000.  Upper Colorado River Commission. 
8. Comments to Congress on the Colorado River Compact, Commissioner of Reclamation Arthur Powell Davis, 
Cong. Rec., January 30, 1923, pp. 2713-2717. 
9. Estimate of 1997 Colorado Water Use, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, April 30, 1997.  However, 1997 is a year 
of declared surplus.  Under a normal year, Lower Basin mainstem uses are limited to 7.5 maf/yr. 
10. The Bureau of Reclamation Consumptive Uses and Losses Report, 1981-1985, shows total Lower Basin 
reservoir evaporation of about 1.0 maf/yr.  However, current accounting of the Lower Colorado Region of the 
Bureau of Reclamation estimates 1.8 maf/yr., informal communication. 
 
Source:  James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water From the 
Colorado River - Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290 (2001) 
